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Abstract. The autonomic management of federated authoriza-
tion infrastructures (federations) is seen as a means for improving the monitor-
ing and use of a service provider’s resources. However, federations are com-
prised of independent management domains with varying scopes of control and 
data ownership. The focus of this paper is on the autonomic management of 
federated identity providers by service providers located in other domains, 
when the identity providers have been diagnosed as the source of abuse. In par-
ticular, we describe how an autonomic controller, external to the domain of the 
identity provider, exercises control over the issuing of privilege attributes. The 
paper presents a conceptual design and implementation of an effector for an 
identity provider that is capable of enabling cross-domain autonomic manage-
ment. The implementation of an effector for a SimpleSAMLphp identity pro-
vider is evaluated by demonstrating how an autonomic controller, together with 
the effector, is capable of responding to malicious abuse. 
Keywords. identity management, self-adaptive authorization, federated author-
ization, computing security, autonomic computing 
1 Introduction 
Autonomic computing is fast becoming a means of improving traditional methods for 
repairing, managing and evolving systems in a plethora of application domains [1]. 
One particular interest within autonomic computing is solutions that enable autonom-
ic management of entities within complex systems, such as the autonomic manage-
ment of federated authorization infrastructures (federations). Federations can be rep-
resented as a network of identity providers (IdPs) that identify and authenticate sub-
jects (users) in order to facilitate their access to remote service providers’ (SPs) re-
sources.  
One aspect of managing federated authorization infrastructures is how to respond 
to subjects whose interactions and usage of resources becomes abusive, or malicious, 
whilst being within the bounds of their access privileges. For example, in the case of 
Wikileaks, an army intelligence officer allegedly accessed (then subsequently leaked) 
hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. Department of Defence cables [2].  Since 
each individual access was granted by the SP’s access control system, it did not detect 
any abuse. Had it done so, and the system had been federated, then the SP would have 
faced a dilemma, since the user’s privilege attributes would have been assigned by a 
trusted IdP, and not by itself. The SP consequently loses some control over exactly 
who the subjects are and how they are authorised. It is a challenging task for human 
administrators to monitor, and respond to these potential malicious events today. They 
may only resolve these by either 1) removing the trust they have placed in the IdP, 2) 
by personally requesting the IdP to limit the offending subjects’ privilege attributes, 
or 3) by stopping all accesses by anyone with these privilege attributes (unless they 
can uniquely identify the particular user, which is not always the case in federated 
systems). This is clearly time consuming and unsatisfactory. 
Previous work [3] identified the need for autonomic management of (federated) au-
thorization infrastructures, and described the Self-Adaptive Authorization Framework 
(SAAF). SAAF analyses subject behaviour via subject usage of authorization services 
(i.e., from authorization decisions). It considers various adaptation strategies against 
the IdPs’ and SP’s components within federations. There are several challenges when 
considering the autonomic management of IdPs. Whilst SPs own the resources where 
the malicious behaviour is identified, they do not own the subject’s privilege attrib-
utes that confer access. These belong to the IdPs. Yet SPs are required to limit these 
privileges in order to prevent further malicious events within their own domain. As-
suming a SP deploys an autonomic controller, the controller is normally restricted in 
its operation to the SP’s domain whilst the IdP is outside this domain. Therefore, ad-
aptation strategies can only be executed on the IdP with its permission. Without this, 
the autonomic controller will need to resort to high consequence adaptations within its 
own domain (such as removing all trust in the IdP). Increasing the likelihood that an 
IdP will permit the requested adaptations requires a secure and configurable solution, 
in which the IdP maintains ownership of its data, and can act on adaptation requests 
through varying means, which it ultimately controls.  
The contribution of this paper is to define and implement the enabling concepts of 
automated and semi-automated management of subjects’ privilege attributes within 
IdP domains, by SP domains. We describe the enabling solution as an effector, to be 
deployed within an IdP’s domain. An implementation of the effector is deployed as 
part of an extended SimpleSAMLphp [4] IdP. An instance of SAAF, the autonomic 
controller, is deployed as part of a SimpleSAMLphp SP. We show that the perfor-
mance of this system is good.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review background 
and related work. In Section 3 we describe a conceptual design to the problem area. In 
Section 4 we detail an implementation of the conceptual design. Section 5 describes 
the experimental results. Finally, Section 6 concludes by summarising the work done 
so far, and indicating future directions of research. 
2 Background and Related Work 
This section details a brief review of background and current work, which motivates 
this research, within the areas of authorization infrastructures, identity management, 
and autonomic computing. 
2.1 Federated Authorization Infrastructures 
Federated authorization infrastructures (federations) refer to a collection of distributed 
services and assets (such as privilege attributes and authorization policies) that enable 
the sharing and protection of organisational resources, across organisational domains 
[5]. Organisations, known as SPs, share their resources with users authenticated by 
trusted third party organisations, known as IdPs. Authorization is given in conform-
ance to an authorization model, such as the Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) 
model [6]. ABAC authorization policies state the permissions (actions executable 
against a resource) assigned to various attribute types and values, which the IdPs are 
required to store and provide on behalf of their subjects.  
There are various technologies that exist to enable federations. X.509 [7] defines a 
distributed privilege management infrastructure built with attribute certificates, upon 
which SAML attribute assertions [8] were modelled. Shibboleth [9] uses the SAML 
standard to protect web services over a network, requiring users accessing Shibboleth 
protected resources to authenticate against their IdP in order for the latter to provide 
attribute assertions to the former. SimpleSAMLphp [4] is an alternative implementa-
tion of the same SAML standard.  PERMIS [10] was originally an implementation of 
the X.509 privilege management infrastructure, but was subsequently enhanced to 
support SAML attribute assertions as well. OpenID Connect [11] and IETF Abfab 
[12] are two of the latest federation protocols, which are in the final stages of being 
standardised. 
2.2 Self-Adaptation and Authorization 
The Self-Adaptive Authorization Framework (SAAF) [3] is a solution for improving 
the monitoring and regulation of resource usage within federations, through autonom-
ic management. SAAF adapts authorization assets (i.e., privilege attributes and au-
thorization policies) in response to identifying malicious/abusive behaviour. Mali-
cious behaviour is identified by the monitoring of subject usage in conformance to 
behaviour rules (defined at deployment) that classify malicious patterns of usage (e.g., 
high rate of access requests). The deployment of SAAF (Figure 1) comprises an auto-
nomic controller, owned by a SP, monitoring the use of its authorization services in 
relation to its protected resources. This is achieved through a feedback control loop 
[13], adapting authorization assets to further prevent or mitigate malicious behaviour.  
 
Fig. 1. Autonomic management in federated authorization infrastructures 
In the case of adapting SP assets (authorization policies), the SAAF autonomic con-
troller is trusted by the SP to carry out the necessary adaptations, implying strict con-
trol. However, a critical adaptation within SAAF is the adaptation of authorization 
assets belonging to IdPs where control is restricted (loose control). 
2.3 Related Work 
To the best of our knowledge no other works explore the role of autonomic control-
lers across different management domains, in particular, within the area of federated 
identity management. However, similar works exist which explore the autonomic 
management of complex systems. For example, an autonomic management frame-
work [14] for web services describes autonomic controllers deployed at the point of 
service, enabling services to identify and resolve their own management problems. 
Our work differs in that autonomic controllers are not applicable for all types of ser-
vices within a federated authorization infrastructure, as malicious behaviour identified 
by SPs cannot be identified by the source (IdPs). This requires external autonomic 
controllers to operate across management domains. Other papers explore the role of 
autonomic management and cooperation between differing services within a network 
[15], whereby trust and reputation is relied upon to increase the favourability of coop-
eration (in our case, adaptation). In comparison, our work provides a platform for 
autonomic management in which trust already exists for issuing of privilege attrib-
utes, as a fundamental component of federations. 
3 Managing Identity Providers 
This section details the conceptual design for enabling the autonomic management of 
identity providers. 
3.1 Conceptual Design 
The ability to manage IdPs relies specifically on the trust that an IdP has in the (auto-
nomic controller of the) requesting SP. For example, a SP identifies malicious/abusive 
activity associated with a subject belonging to an IdP. The SP might request the IdP to 
remove the subject’s identity attribute(s) which grant the subject access rights at the 
SP. However, these identity attributes may give the subject access rights at many SPs, 
and not only at the abused SP. In the latter case the IdP might easily decide to grant 
the removal request. In the former case the decision is more difficult and hinges par-
tially on whether the IdP is more concerned about upsetting its subject or the many 
SPs that it has trust relationships with (and which the subject might similarly be abus-
ing). If the request is refused the SP is left with several options:  
- allow the malicious activity to continue (for example, when the alternative 
options have a greater cost when compared to the malicious activity), or  
- ask the IdP to alter its attribute release / issuing policy so that it does not is-
sue attribute assertions for this subject, or 
- remove access rights from this specific subject (challenging, as it depends on 
how subjects are identified, i.e., through persistent or transient IDs) or  
- remove access rights from all subjects who share the same set of identity at-
tributes with the abusive subject, or  
- remove all trust from this particular IdP (for example, the IdP has refused 
numerous adaptation requests and the abusive behaviour continues). 
To avoid the last option being taken, it is in an IdP’s interest to comply with re-
quests for management changes in relation to either its attribute release policy or one 
of its subject’s identity attributes, otherwise SPs may associate too much risk in using 
the IdP. It is for these complex reasons that we have defined the autonomic manage-
ment to be about the IdP’s output i.e., its assertions about a subject’s privilege attrib-
utes, so that it is independent of the actual internal mechanisms employed by the IdP 
to achieve this. Autonomic controllers only depend on the final outcome, which is to 
control the privilege attributes that the IdP will assert for a particular subject in the 
future. The IdP therefore remains in control of the corrective action that is to be taken, 
and deciding how to achieve the desired objective. We therefore propose the follow-
ing two definitions: 
Definition 1. We define the automated management of a subject’s privilege attrib-
ute assertions within a federated identity management infrastructure as: the ability for 
an autonomic controller, situated in a SP’s domain, to issue adaptations to an IdP’s 
domain in order to immediately control the privilege attribute assertions that the IdP 
will issue for that subject when it subsequently requests access to the SP’s resources. 
Definition 2. We define the semi-automated management of a subject’s privilege 
attribute assertions within a federated identity management infrastructure as: a variant 
of definition 1, whereby the IdP’s domain queues adaptations for a human controller 
to review, before execution. 
 
Fig. 2. Conceptual design 
Figure 2 details the conceptual components of a managed IdP, which are required 
both to provide information to the autonomic controller (within the domain of a SP), 
and to control and enable it to request changes to a subject’s asserted privilege attrib-
utes. The effector is the enabler for adaptations concerning an IdP. The authorization 
service at the IdP authorizes the autonomic controller, via the effector, to change ei-
ther the issuing policy (which controls the subject’s attribute assertions) or the attrib-
ute repository (which holds the subject’s attributes). The audit log provides the effec-
tor with mappings between the local IDs of subjects and the IDs presented to the SP 
in the security assertions. The authorization services at the SP utilise the subject’s 
security assertions provided by the IdP’s authenticating and issuing services. The 
autonomic controller requests adaptations against the IdP’s effector, and receives state 
changes (i.e., subject no longer has privilege attribute ‘x’), to confirm adaptations. 
3.2 Identity Provider 
We assume an IdP is capable of authenticating a user as being one of its subjects, and 
of providing attribute assertions about an authenticated subject to SPs. The IdP is 
capable of utilising supporting technologies that facilitate the storage and access of 
subject credentials/privilege attributes, for example, the Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP). These privilege attributes are assumed to be cryptographically se-
cured and provided to trusted SPs as security assertions, following a standard proto-
col, such as SAML [8]. We also assume IdPs are able to log and audit security asser-
tion assignments, as well as the authentications made through the IdP authentication 
services and any random, transient or session identifiers that are assigned to the sub-
jects in the security assertions. Without these auditing capabilities, IdPs are unable to 
map session usage to actual subjects, in case they need to identify subjects when re-
sponding to notifications of malicious activity. 
3.3 Autonomic Controller and Service Provider 
The autonomic controller is capable of observing activity within the SP’s resources to 
produce a state, specifically in relation to the accessing subjects and the use of subject 
privileges. The autonomic controller is able to classify malicious/abusive behaviour as 
behaviour rules. Behaviour rules are defined at deployment by sources of authority 
within the SP domain, and relevant to the SP’s environment (i.e., academic / govern-
mental). The autonomic controller is able to assess conformance to behaviour rules by 
observing subject usage, and respond when abusive behaviour has been identified. We 
make the assumption that the responses made by the autonomic controller are neces-
sary, although the method in which abusive behaviour is identified, and the response 
chosen, is not covered by this paper. The autonomic controller is placed in the SP 
domain, as it is intrinsic to identification of malicious activity attributed through the 
subject’s direct actions against the SP.  
In the case of managing IdPs, an autonomic controller’s adaptations refer to the 
modification of privilege attribute assertions. Each request made by an autonomic 
controller specifies an abstract adaptation operation along with enabling information, 
such as the persistent ID to which malicious behaviour is attributed, and the privilege 
attributes used. Requests are made over a reliable communications protocol and are 
idempotent, meaning that the autonomic controller will expect to always get a re-
sponse. The autonomic controller may continue to make the same request (until a 
timeout is reached) if a response is not received, without adapting the final state of the 
IdP’s system. Upon timeout or a failure response the adaptation is classed as failed. 
Request-responses may be synchronous or asynchronous. Synchronous communica-
tions are used to implement the automated management of a subject’s attribute asser-
tions, whereas asynchronous communications are used to implement semi-automated 
management. 
3.4 Identity Provider Effector 
The IdP’s effector is under the full control of the IdP administrator. He/she configures 
it to process adaptations requested by a SP’s autonomic controller, either synchro-
nously, or asynchronously. Communication flows between the IdP’s effector and IdP 
software are made internally and rely on a host’s operating system to ensure security. 
Communication between an autonomic controller and an IdP’s effector are executed 
via secure communication, such as TLS/SSL, and require mutual authentication. 
The effector requires access to issuing policies, attribute repositories and audit 
logs, within the IdP. Access to issuing policies is required in order to adapt the policy 
controlling the subjects’ privilege attributes asserted by the IdP (if allowed by the 
administrator). Access to logs is required to map between an identifier (persistent or 
transient) that the SP has received, and the internal identifier of the subject. Access to 
attribute repositories is needed to modify a subject’s privilege attributes (if allowed). 
The effector supports a set of abstract adaptations that are necessary when manag-
ing an IdP. It is expected to translate these abstract adaptations into concrete adap-
tions that are supported by the underlying technology. For example, ‘remove subject’s 
privilege attribute assertion’ may be translated into the relevant LDAP modify com-
mand in order to be executed against the LDAP directory, or into the appropriate 
Shibboleth attribute release policy to stop the SAML attribute assertion being created. 
The list of executable adaptations is as follows, and these are referred to as the effec-
tor operations: 1) Remove privilege attribute assertion from all subjects, 2) Remove 
privilege attribute assertion from identified subject, 3) Add privilege attribute asser-
tion for all subjects, and 4) Add privilege attribute assertion for identified subject. 
A consequence of defining such a set of abstract operations is that it allows the IdP 
to utilise an authorization service to determine which operations to allow and which to 
deny, and then to determine how to implement the allowed ones. The addition of priv-
ilege attribute assertions is provided in order to specify a subject with reduced privi-
leges (as a new attribute), where attributes exist within a hierarchy. For example, a 
Supervisor attribute inherits from an Employee attribute. 
4 Implementation 
This section describes the implementation of the effector for a SimpleSAMLphp [4] 
IdP, and shows how it can be integrated with an autonomic controller. 
4.1 Federated Authorization Infrastructure 
The effector together with a single SP and a single IdP are implemented as a SAML 
compliant federation. SimpleSAMLphp is used as the unifying technology to enable 
communication between the two providers. This is a basic federated authorization 
infrastructure to demonstrate the effector, however the effector could potentially be 
used in setups with multiple services and IdPs. 
The IdP is implemented on a single host machine, whereby an instance of Sim-
pleSAMLphp is installed and configured to provide IdP services. An open LDAP 
server is installed to store subject privilege attributes and authentication information. 
Finally, an implementation of a SimpleSAMLphp IdP effector is installed, compliant 
with our conceptual design, to enable cross-domain management. The effector makes 
use of open LDAP’s access control lists in order to manage the extent of adaptations a 
client is permitted to request. 
The SP is implemented across two host machines, one to host the SP’s resources 
(resource host), and one to host an autonomic controller and authorization services 
(authorization host). The authorization host deploys an implementation of SAAF [3] 
and an instance of PERMIS [10], which is used to protect the SP’s resources deployed 
on the resource host. PERMIS is capable of utilising ABAC authorization policies to 
provide the validation of SAML attribute assertions issued by IdPs, and access control 
decisions to the resource host. 
4.2 Extending SimpleSAMLphp 
To facilitate operations by the IdP’s effector, we extended the logging capabilities of 
SimpleSAMLphp in order to always ensure the correct retrieval of a subject’s LDAP 
distinguished (unique) name. SimpleSAMLphp stores its log information in a rela-
tional database (SQLite). In its original configuration, SimpleSAMLphp was only 
capable of mapping persistent IDs to subject attribute values. Additional information, 
such as attribute type, LDAP host, and LDAP search base, is needed in order to locate 
the actual subjects’ LDAP entries for both transient and persistent IDs. Whilst some 
of this information e.g. LDAP host names, is available in the SimpleSAMLphp con-
figuration file, it is not persistent to configuration changes. For this reason we decided 
to record all this additional information in the log DB, so that the effector is always 
able to identify the abusive subject’s distinguished name. 
4.3 SimpleSAMLphp Effector 
The SimpleSAMLphp effector, shown in Figure 3, implements a subset of the effector 
component shown in Figure 2. It is a PHP web service hosted alongside the Sim-
pleSAMLphp IdP service.  It has access to the log database stored within the Sim-
pleSAMLphp directory, which enables it to map between persistent and transient IDs 
and a subject’s distinguished name. Web service clients, such as the SAAF controller, 
can access the effector providing they have been issued with a trusted client X.509 
certificate. Mutual SSL/TLS authentication is required and the client’s certificate 
distinguished name is used to identify the requesting client. 
Although the effector component conforms to the conceptual design described in 
Section 3, it is somewhat restricted due to the limited capabilities of Sim-
pleSAMLphp. SimpleSAMLphp relies upon an attribute repository, such as LDAP, 
along with an attribute release / issuing policy which is represented by a PHP configu-
ration file. However, the attribute release policy is constrained to stating only which 
attributes can be released to which SPs, regardless of the individual subject. As a 
result the effector adapts subject attributes held in the LDAP repository in order to 
achieve the per subject granularity. Modifying the privilege attribute assertions for all 
subjects is implemented by changing the SP’s PERMIS credential validation policy 
rather than the SimpleSAMLphp attribute release policy. However, if the SP’s author-
ization services do not provide credential validation policies, then adaptation of at-
tribute release policies will be needed. 
When operating synchronously, the effector utilises the LDAP access control lists 
in order to authorize the subject level adaptation requests, notifying requesting clients 
of failure in case the client is unauthorized. When operating asynchronously, meaning 
manual review is required, the effector queues requests and notifies administrators via 
email when new requests are received. Human administrators then review the queued 
requests before allowing the effector to execute an adaptation and inform the client of 
success or failure. The effector is initialised once it receives a SOAP message request 
from a client. From here SOAP requests are processed in the following manner: 1) 
mutually authenticate the requesting client over TLS and obtain the requestor’s dis-
tinguished name (DN) from its certificate, 2) verify the requested operation is valid, 
3) retrieve the target subject’s unique attribute mapping from the persistent/transient 
ID stored in the SimpleSAMLphp audit log database, 4) retrieve the subjects’ DN(s) 
using the relevant LDAP host name and search base, 5) translate the requested opera-
tion into LDAP executable operations, 6) bind the requestor’s DN to the relevant 
LDAP server, 7) execute the update operation against LDAP, providing the access 
control list allows it, 8) respond to the client with confirmation of the state changes. 
 
Fig. 3. Effector for SimpleSAMLphp IdP 
5 Experiments 
In this section, we discuss the deployment of the SimpleSAMLphp IdP and its effec-
tor in relation to a case of abuse identified with a SAAF controller. 
5.1 Adaptation Scenario 
The SimpleSAMLphp IdP is configured to issue persistent IDs with the release of 
privilege attributes for authenticated subjects. An LDAP directory is populated with 
subject authentication and privilege attributes. The effector is deployed, configured to 
run synchronously, and rely on an LDAP access control list to restrict the actions of a 
SAAF autonomic controller.  
The SP is configured to host a payroll web application that utilises a policy en-
forcement point (PEP). The PEP requires subjects to 1) authenticate against the sub-
ject’s IdP, 2) obtain the subject’s releasable privilege attributes in the form of a 
SAML assertion (via SimpleSAMLphp), and 3) utilise the SP’s authorization services 
to provide an authorization decision. PERMIS is deployed with an authorization poli-
cy that states the IdP is trusted to assign the privilege attribute ‘permis-
Role=employee’ to its subjects. This privilege attribute can be used to execute the 
permission of ‘get employee payslip’ on the payroll web application. The SAAF au-
tonomic controller is deployed with a simple behaviour policy stating that no single 
subject belonging to the IdP may request access to any of the SP’s resources, greater 
than 10 requests per minute. This is to stop automated attacks. SAAF profiles usage 
based on subjects’ persistent IDs associated with the federated access requests. 
Should this rule be broken SAAF identifies the subject as committing abuse and can 
respond through various adaptation strategies. The best adaptation strategy is chosen 
based on a weighted decision problem solving algorithm, for example, considering the 
cost of realising the adaptation strategy against the cost of allowing abuse to continue.   
In this scenario, a subject registered with the IdP, requests access to ‘get employee 
payslip’ more than 10 times within a minute interval. Each time the subject requests 
access, PERMIS logs the request, detailing the subject’s attributes from the subject’s 
SAML assertion, the subject’s persistent ID, and access decision given.  The SAAF 
autonomic controller builds up the subject’s pattern of access based on these logged 
events, checking conformance access against its behaviour policy. SAAF identifies 
that the stated behaviour rule has been broken, and reacts by requesting the Sim-
pleSAMLphp effector to prevent the subject from using the privilege attribute of 
‘permisRole=employee’. The SAAF autonomic controller encapsulates this request in 
a SOAP message, which is sent over a mutually authenticated HTTPS connection to 
the effector. It contains an operation (remove privilege attribute), the subject’s persis-
tent ID observed from the subject’s SAML assertions, the SP’s ID to identify where 
the persistent ID was used, attribute type (permisRole) and attribute value (employee). 
Providing the effector’s response to the client indicates a successful adaptation 
(i.e., subject will no longer be issued permisRole=employee), the SAAF controller 
assumes the adaptation has been successful. However, if the response indicates an 
unsuccessful state, the offending subject is free to continue committing malicious 
behaviour. If the subject’s behaviour continues, SAAF may take steps to remove the 
trustworthiness of the IdP in question, but this is not addressed here.  
5.2 Performance and Load Tests 
We have executed four types of load and performance tests. These tests are catego-
rised as T1 – successful adaptation, T2 – invalid operation, T3 – invalid subject map-
ping, and T4 – LDAP error (either not authorized or unable to execute action). Tests 
were performed on two virtual machines (Debian 6.0.5 512MB memory hosted on a 
2.4Ghz, 3GB memory MS Windows machine), as server and client, where threads on 
the client machine were used to depict multiple virtual clients.  
We measured the average response times within an interval of one second (reflect-
ing the minimum SAAF autonomic controller adaptation cycle), issuing requests 
within a single initial burst until the interval was complete. On average, with the min-
imum load of one client (one SAAF) issuing one request per second, we found per-
formance of T1 requests could be executed in 65ms, T2 in 49ms, T3 in 50ms, and 
finally T4 in 62ms. We identified that the maximum load (Figure 4) was reached with 
18 clients executing one request within the one-second interval.  
In practice we do not expect SAAF to create a high load on this effector, due to the 
nature in which it executes adaptation strategies. As more adaptation requests are 
made, it is likely to coincide with increased levels of malicious activity, causing the 
autonomic controller to resort to high consequence adaptations that are out of scope of 
the effector, such as changing its local PERMIS policy.  
 
Fig. 4. Average (mean) response time, with standard error, against number of clients 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has presented an approach for enabling the autonomic management of 
federated identity providers (IdPs) across independent management domains. The 
motivation for this work is the fact that service provider (SP) domains can diagnose 
IdP domains as the source of malicious abuse. At the conceptual level, the basis of the 
proposed approach is the integration of an autonomic controller, positioned in the 
domain of a SP, with an effector, positioned in the domain of an IdP. We present the 
conceptual design of the effector, whilst satisfying key safeguards such as, ensuring 
the IdP remains in complete control of its assets. This effector has been implemented 
and evaluated through the deployment of a federated authorization infrastructure, 
which incorporates a SimpleSAMLphp IdP. We have shown that an autonomic con-
troller is able to manage, via the effector, an IdP’s ability to assign privilege attributes 
to its subjects. Through performance and load testing, we have shown that the IdP’s 
effector is capable of operating with multiple autonomic controllers when handling 
adaptation requests within an autonomic controller’s minimum adaptation cycle. 
In the work described in this paper, it is recognised that the autonomic controller 
does not have strict control over the IdP, and relies on the IdP’s goodwill. In order for 
control to be more effectively applied, it would be necessary to have a legal service 
agreement or similar between the SP and IdP, whereby the IdP agrees to enact the 
SP’s adaptation requests. In this way, the sphere of control exercised by the SP’s au-
tonomic controller would extend beyond the domain of the SP with which it is associ-
ated, to that of the IdPs to which the SP is contractually bound. Our future work aims 
to explore the requirements of service agreements between SPs and IdPs in order to 
ensure control when managing subjects’ access rights between different domains. 
References 
1. Kephart, J.O., Chess, D.M.: The Vision of Autonomic Computing. In Computer 36, pp 41--
50 (2003). 
2. G. Adams.: Private Memo Exposes US Fears over Wikileaks. In The Independent. Availa-
ble at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/private-memo-exposes-us-fears-
over-wikileaks-2177041.html (2011). 
3. Bailey, C., Chadwick, D.W., de Lemos, R.: Self-Adaptive Authorization Framework for 
Policy Based RBAC/ABAC Models. In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Ninth International 
Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, pp. 37--44 (2011). 
4. SimpleSAMLphp Version 1.9.2. Available at http://simplesamlphp.org/. 
5. Chadwick, D.W.: Federated Identity Management. In A. Aldini, G. Barthe, and R. Gorrieri 
(Eds.): FOSAD 2008/2009, LNCS 5705, pp. 96--120, (2009). 
6. ITU-T Rec X.812 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-3:1996 “Security Frameworks for open systems: 
Access control framework”. 
7. ISO 9594-8/ITU-T Rec. X.509 (2001) The Directory:  Public-key and attribute certificate 
frameworks. 
8. OASIS “Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) Version 2.0”. 
9. Morgan, R. L., Cantor, S., Carmody, S., Hoen, W., Klingenstein, K.: Federated Security: 
The Shibboleth Approach. EDUCAUSE Quarterly, (2004). 
10. Chadwick, D.W., Zhao, G., Otenko, S., Laborde, R., Su, L., Nguyen, T.A.: PERMIS: A 
modular Authorization Infrastructure. In Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Ex-
perience, pp 1341--1357 (2008). 
11. Sakimura, N. et al. “OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 - draft 18”. 26 March 2013. Available at 
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-standard-1_0.html. 
12. Howlett, J. et al. “Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond Web (ABFAB) Ar-
chitecture”. draft-ietf-abfab-arch-05.txt, 25 Feb, 2013.  
13. Brun, Y., Serugendo, G.M., Gacek, C., Giese, H., Keinie, H., Litoiu, M., Muller, H., Peeze, 
M., Shaw, M.: Engineering Self-Adaptive Systems through Feedback Loops. In Software 
Engineering for Self-Adaptive Systems, pp 48--70 (2009). 
14. Cheng, Y., Leon-Garcia, A., Foster, I.: Toward an Autonomic Service Management 
Framework: A Holistic Vision of SOA, AON, and Autonomic Computing. In IEEE Com-
munications Magazine 46, Issue 5, pp 138--146 (2008). 
15. Psaier, H., Juszczyk, L., Skopik, F., Schall, D., Dustdar, S.: Runtime Behaviour Monitoring 
and Self-Adaptation in Service-Oriented Systems. In Proceedings of the 2010 Fourth IEEE 
International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, pp 164--173 
(2010). 
